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Raihani and Smith show competitive
helping in donations made to online
fundraising pages. Males respond
competitively to donations made by other
males, but only when giving to an
attractive female fundraiser. Female
donors do not compete in this way. These
findings suggest a role for sexual
selection in explaining conspicuous
generosity.
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Unconditional generosity in humans is a puzzle. One
possibility is that individuals benefit from being
seen as generous if there is competition for access
to partners and if generosity is a costly—and
therefore reliable—signal of partner quality [1–3].
The ‘‘competitive helping’’ hypothesis predicts that
people will compete to be the most generous, partic-
ularly in the presence of attractive potential part-
ners [1]. However, this key prediction has not been
directly tested. Using data from online fundraising
pages, we demonstrate competitive helping in the
real world. Donations to fundraising pages are public
and made sequentially. Donors can therefore
respond to the behavior of previous donors, creating
a potential generosity tournament. Our test of the
competitive helping hypothesis focuses on the
response to large, visible donations. We show that
male donors show significantly stronger responses
(by donating more) when they are donating to an
attractive female fundraiser and responding to a
large donation made by another male donor. The
responses for this condition are around four times
greater than when males give to less-attractive
female (or male) fundraisers or when they respond
to a large donation made by a female donor. Unlike
males, females do not compete in donations when
giving to attractive male fundraisers. These data
suggest that males use competitive helping displays
in the presence of attractive females and suggest a
role for sexual selection in explaining unconditional
generosity.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Despite individual incentives to free-ride, humans often coop-
erate in social dilemmas. In repeated, two-player games, individ-
uals can benefit if the partner reciprocates [4], whereas in larger
groups, the possibility that cheating will be punished [5] or that
generous actions will be rewarded [6] are possible explanations
for cooperation. Most of the evidence for punishment and
rewarding, however, comes from laboratory studies, while the
prevalence of these strategies in real-world settings has been
questioned [5]. A plausible alternative—yet seldom acknowl-
edged—mechanism is so-called ‘‘competitive helping’’ [2] (alsoCurrent Biology 25, 11known as ‘‘competitive altruism’’ [1]). This theory assumes that
there is a biological market [2], where individuals compete for ac-
cess to partners with the highest market value by signaling their
value through costly helping displays [1]. Signal reliability is
maintained by the cost associated with sending it [3]. Extrava-
gant helping displays might therefore serve as an honest signal
of an individual’s underlying quality [7], including access to re-
sources or cooperative intent. Although the term competitive
altruism is commonly used to describe extravagant generosity
(e.g., [1, 8–13]), competitive helping displays are not truly altru-
istic since the signaler is expected to derive personal benefits
from their actions.
Several laboratory studies offer evidence suggestive of
competitive helping. People are more generous when they are
observed [8–10], and the most helpful individuals are preferen-
tially chosen for subsequent interactions requiring cooperation
[11–13]. Costly helping displays could be used to attract sexual
partners. Although males tend to prioritize physical cues of
fertility when choosing mates [14], females place a higher pre-
mium on resource acquisition [14] and have also been shown
to be more sensitive to cooperative tendency in sexual partners
[15]—both of which may be advertised via helpful actions. Thus,
competitive helping might be particularly pronounced among
males (although this does not preclude female-female competi-
tion in this or other contexts). Indeed, males are more sensitive
than females to the presence of an opposite sex audience
when performing helping behavior [9, 16]. While these various
studies indicate that people are motivated to acquire a good
reputation and that individuals might be preferred as partners
on this basis, the acid test of competitive helping requires evi-
dence that people compete directly, by increasing generosity
in response to displays from competitors [1, 13]. To our knowl-
edge, no study has provided evidence of responsive competitive
helping. We do this here.
We used data from a large, UK-based, online fundraising plat-
form to test a key prediction of the competitive helping hypoth-
esis: males respond competitively to the generosity bids of other
males in the presence of attractive females. Online fundraising
platforms provide a unique forum to test this idea in a real-world
setting. Fundraisers host fundraising pages where they provide
personal information (name, photo, charity, and event they are
being sponsored for) and collect donations, with nearly all dona-
tions coming from donors personally known to them. Donations
to fundraising pages are made sequentially, and the names and
contributions of all donors to a fundraiser’s page are visible in
chronological order (unless donors opt for anonymity) so that
new donors can see who has donated before them and how
much [17]. This creates a potential tournament in which donors
may compete by responding to how much others have given.83–1186, May 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1183


























Figure 1. Male and Female Donor Responses to Large Donations
Made by Other Donors
Change in amount given (£, effect size and confidence intervals from a single
LMM) among male donors (n = 1,800) and female donors (n = 1,295) in
response to a large donation relative to the PRE-mean. ‘‘Competitive helping
scenario’’ refers to the casewhere competitive helping would be expected. For
males, this case is an attractive female fundraiser and a large donation by
another male donor. For females, this case is an attractive male fundraiser and
a large donation by another female donor. ‘‘All other scenarios’’ refers to all
other cases.Previous work has shown that existing donations on a page act
as an anchor for current donors, indicating that donors do pay
attention to other donors’ actions in this setting [17]. Here, we
ask whether donors’ behavior was affected by the gender and
attractiveness of the fundraiser and whether they competed
with other donors of the same gender.
For our analysis sample of 2,561 fundraising pages, the mean
(±SEM) number of donations per page was 42.8 (±0.71), aver-
aging £30.3 (±0.22) per donor. The average total amount raised
per page was £1,300.50 (±28.4) (see Table S1 for all descriptive
statistics). Regardless of their gender, more-attractive fundrais-
ers raised more money than less-attractive fundraisers: a 1-SD
increase in attractiveness was associated with an average
£182.3 (±54.0) increase in total amount raised by fundraisers,
controlling for their age (linear regression: F1, 2544 = 11.4; p =
0.001; Table S2). Attractive fundraisers of both sexes received
more donations (linear regression: F1, 2544 = 8.41; p = 0.004;
Table S2) and, to a lesser extent, also received larger donations
(linear regression: F1, 2544 = 2.78; p = 0.10; Table S2). For female
fundraisers, attractiveness was significantly correlated with
maximum donation size (linear regression: F 1, 2543 = 9.08; p =
0.003; Table S2), which increased by £41.1 (±13.6) with a 1-SD
increase in attractiveness. All donation data are available online
(Data S1).
Our test for competitive helping focused on donors’ responses
to ‘‘large,’’ visible donations on a fundraising page (large was
defined as at least twice the previous page mean and more1184 Current Biology 25, 1183–1186, May 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltdthan £50, sensu [17]). Responses to large donations were
measured by calculating the difference in amount given after
the large donation (£) relative to the mean donation size for
that page prior to the large donation (hereafter referred to as
the ‘‘PRE-mean’’). The PRE-mean was calculated using up to
ten (where available, sensu [17]) donations made prior to the
large donation. Note that we only used donations made by
donors of the same gender, so the male response is calculated
relative to the PRE-mean defined for male donors. For each
fundraising page, we considered the responses of up to 15 do-
nors (where available) following the large donation, yielding a
sample size of 1,800 for male donor responses and 1,295 for
female donor responses. ‘‘Fundraising page ID’’ was included
as a random term in each model to control for the effects of
repeated observations for the same fundraiser and fundraising
page on the distribution of the data.
Arriving on a fundraising page after large donations has been
shown to have a positive effect on the size of donations, with
no effect on the quantity of donations [17]. In our sample,
1,829 pages had large donations (mean large donation size:
£115.20 ± £2.69). Of these, 420 were made by males and 248
by females, with the remainder not gender assignable. We focus
our analysis on the 668 large donations for which we could
assign a gender. Summary statistics are given in Table S1. The
size of a large donation did not significantly differ by either donor
or fundraiser gender (tests for equality of means, all p > 0.05; see
Supplemental Information). Results from a linear mixed model
(LMM) with maximum likelihood shows that, in line with previous
results [17], a large donation had a positive effect on subsequent
amounts, increasing donations by £9.55 (±1.27).
Under the competitive helping hypothesis, we expected a
significantly stronger response by donors when (1) the fundraiser
was an attractive member of the opposite sex (where ‘‘attrac-
tive’’ was defined as being within the top quartile), and (2) the
large donation was made by someone of the same sex. We
contrasted the responses by donors in this competitive helping
condition to their responses in all other cases. Results are sum-
marized in Figure 1. For males, we found that a large donation
was associated with an additional response of £28.35 (±7.75)
in the competitive helping case, over and above the average
response in all other cases, which was £9.61 (±1.61). This addi-
tional response bymale donors in the competitive helping condi-
tion was significantly different to that in all other cases (c21, 1800 =
13.38; p < 0.001). However, when we ran a similar model for
female donors, asking whether females would show a greater
response when giving to an attractive male fundraiser and
when the large donation was made by another female, we found
that female donors did not show greater responses in the
competitive helping case (c21, 1295 = 0.54; p = 0.461).
We then explored variation in male donor responses in more
detail. Using the same response term (change in donation
amount, £, relative to the PRE-mean), we ran a LMM with fund-
raising page ID as the random term and the three-way interaction
between three categorical explanatory variables: fundraiser
gender (male/female), fundraiser attractiveness (plain/average/
attractive), and large donor gender (male/female). Thus, the
model had a 2 3 3 3 2 design (Table S3) allowing us to check
whether male responses would be strongest in the scenario pre-















































Figure 2. Male Donor Responses to Large Donations Made by Other
Donors According to Large Donor Gender, Fundraiser Gender, and
Fundraiser Attractiveness
(A and B) Change in amount given (£, effect size and confidence intervals from
a single LMM) among male donors (n = 1,800) in response to a large donation
relative to the PRE-mean. Responses to a large donation varied with the
gender and attractiveness of the fundraiser and varied depending on whether
the large donation was made by a male (A) or female (B) donor. Male donors
increased their giving by more when giving to an attractive female fundraiser
and when responding to a large donation made by a male competitor than in
any other case.attractive female fundraiser and when the large donation was
made by another male) compared to any of the other 11 possible
scenarios. The results are shown in Figure 2 and confirm the
expected pattern: male donors responded to a large donation
to the greatest extent when giving to a female fundraiser who
was attractive and when the large donation came from another
male donor. Their response in this case was significantly greater
(see Table S4)—and around four times larger—than their
response in any of the other 11 cases.
These results support a key prediction of competitive helping
theory [1, 2, 13] by showing that male donors compete directly
with other males in the presence of an attractive, opposite-sex
audience, although we find no evidence for this in females.
Whether competitive helping displays produce fitness benefits
remains an open avenue for further exploration, although previ-
ous work has shown that more-cooperative individuals are
preferred as sexual partners [15]. We also note that competitive
helping responses are not necessarily conscious responses
either to the donations of others or to the perceived attractive-
ness of the fundraiser but may instead reflect responses of an
evolved psychology to maximize the benefits associated with
helping in different contexts. Previous work has shown that do-
nors are sensitive to the donations of others and, in particular,
conform to descriptive social norms by giving what they believe
is the normative amount [18]. In contrast, here we show thatCurrent Biology 25, 11males do not conform to the majority when making donations
but instead compete directly with other males when donating
to attractive females. Excessively cooperative individuals can
be shunned or punished [19] and sometimes opt for anonymity
when making large donations [20]. Our findings provide a
possible explanation for this, indicating that overt generosity
can be a competitive rather than a cooperative act.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Our initial sample consisted of 4,581 pages for the 2014 Virgin London Mara-
thon for which fundraisers had uploaded one profile photo, allowing us to
obtain an attractiveness rating. Of this initial sample, 91 had a URL that did
not link to a page, leaving 4,490 pages. For these pages, we sought four inde-
pendent beauty ratings (on a scale of 0 to 10) of each fundraiser based on their
photo (following [21]) by recruiting 1,189 raters (651males; 520 females; 16 did
not specify) from the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing plat-
form (https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome). The mean age of the raters
was 31 ± 0.3 (range: 18–72). To minimize any confounding effects of inter-
cultural differences in attractiveness ratings [22], we asked only US-based
workers to provide ratings since the majority of workers on MTurk are based
in the US, and the US and UK are categorized as belonging to the same world
culture [23]. Each rater was expected to look at 20 pages. As well as rating
attractiveness, raters were also asked the gender of the fundraiser, what
sort of clothes they were wearing (e.g., sporting/fancy dress), whether they
were smiling, the color of their hair, and approximate age. The questions the
raters were expected to answer are available in the Supplemental Information.
Data on factors affecting fundraiser attractiveness are available online (Data
S2). Donor gender was not observed directly but was inferred on the basis
of their names, acquired from the fundraising pages. We were able to assign
a gender to 46.1% of the donors in our sample. Cases that we could not
include had ambiguous names (e.g., Sam, Chris), multiple names (e.g., Sue
and David), and anonymous donations.
We judged 2,561 fundraisers to have a valid set of attractiveness ratings
where (1) they had at least three non-missing ratings, and (2) all raters agreed
on the fundraiser’s gender. The main reasons for missing ratings were that the
photo was not of a person or that it was of more than one person, such that the
fundraiser could not be identified. We found a high level of agreement among
raters over the attractiveness of fundraisers: for our sample of 2,561 fundrais-
ers, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.88 (0.63 for male fundraisers and 0.94 for female
fundraisers). For our analysis, we created standardized aggregatemeasures of
attractiveness (ai) for each fundraiser in the following way (following [24]). Each
rater rated up to 20 pictures, and each fundraiser had three or four ratings. We
first transformed the rating by rater j of fundraiser i into a Z score and then
took the average of the three or four Z scores for each fundraiser. In line
with previous studies (e.g., [14]), gender, hair color, age, and whether the per-
son was smiling were all significantly correlated with attractiveness (see Sup-
plemental Information). For further statistical details and tables, please refer to
the Supplemental Information.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
four tables, and two data files and can be found with this article online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.02.042.
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